Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Teresa L. Nelson v. Department of Commerce,
Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Robert E. Steed; Melissa M. Hubbell; Assistant Attorneys General;
Attorneys for Respondent.
Ann L. Wasserman; Littlefield & Peterson; Sam N. Papas; Attorneys for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Nelson v. Department of Commerce, No. 920259 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3184

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
60
.A10
DOCKET NO.

-42Q35±kL

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
TERESA L. NELSON,
Petitioner,
Case No. 920259 CA
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing,
Respondent.

Category No. 14

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PETITION TO REVIEW THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION OF
OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE RELATIVE TO PETITIONER'S LICENSES TO PRACTICE AS A
CERTIFIED AND CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER IN THE STATE OF UTAH
ANN L. WASSERMAN (#3395)
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
SAM N. PAPAS (#3745)
8 East 300 South, #213
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-5225

JAN GRAHAM (#1231)
Attorney General
ROBERT E. STEED (# 6036)
MELISSA M. HUBBELL (#5090)
Assistant Attorneys General
Fair Business Enforcement Div.
State Capitol Bldg. Room 111
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1331
Attorneys for Respondent

Attorneys for Petitioner

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

APR 1 2 1S93

iOWft
t/'
f

MaryT. Noonan
Clark of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
TERESA L. NELSON,
Petitioner,
Case No. 920259 CA
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing,
Respondent.

Category No. 14

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PETITION TO REVIEW THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION OF
OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE RELATIVE TO PETITIONER'S LICENSES TO PRACTICE AS A
CERTIFIED AND CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER IN THE STATE OF UTAH
ANN L. WASSERMAN (#3395)
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
SAM N. PAPAS (#3745)
8 East 300 South, #213
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-5225

JAN GRAHAM (#1231)
Attorney General
ROBERT E. STEED (# 6036)
MELISSA M. HUBBELL (#5090)
Assistant Attorneys General
Fair Business Enforcement Div,
State Capitol Bldg. Room 111
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1331
Attorneys for Respondent

Attorneys for Petitioner

LIST OF PARTIES
The parties to this appeal are fully set forth in the
caption of this Brief.

Petitioner, TERESA L. NELSON, is referred

to hereafter as "Nelson," and Respondent, the Department of
Commerce, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of
the State of Utah, is referred to hereafter as "the Division."
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is a review of a final order issued by an
administrative agency of the State of Utah following a formal
adjudicative proceeding.

This Court has jurisdiction over this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a)(Supp. 1992)
and 63-46b-16 (1989) .

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Division disagrees with how Nelson has framed the issues
in her brief.

Nelson has also incorrectly identified the

applicable standard of appellate review for two out of the three
issues raised on appeal.1 (Br. at 1-3). Therefore, the Division
submits its own version of the issues presented on appeal and
will also set forth what the Division believes to be the correct
standard of review for each issue.

1

Rule 24(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires the appellant to provide a statement of the issues
presented for review and the standard of appellate review for each
issue. Nelson raises three issues in her brief. (Br. at 1, 2.)
Nelson's standard of review section (Br. at 2, 3) characterizes all
three issues as findings of fact which are to be reviewed by this
court under the substantial evidence (based on the whole record)
standard of review. (Br. at 2, 3.) The Division disagrees with
Nelson's characterization of two out of the three issues as factual
findings and accordingly will provide its own version of the issues
as well as the appropriate standard of review for each issue.
1

1. DID THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSE HIS
DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF NELSON'S
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION?
Standard of Review:

Appellate review of this issue is

governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (hereafter
"UAPA").
1992).

Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1989 & Cum- Supp.
Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) provides that the court shall

grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been
"substantially prejudiced by any of the following . . . (h) the
agency action is: . . . (i) an abuse of discretion delegated to
the agency by statute."

The UAPA vests the presiding officer (in

this instance the administrative law judge, hereafter "ALJ") with
an explicit grant of discretion to admit or exclude evidence that
is offered at administrative hearings.

Section 63-46b-8(1)(b)(1)

states that "on his own motion or upon objection by a party, the
presiding officer: (i) may exclude

evidence

that is irrelevant,

immaterial, or unduly repetitious." (Emphasis added).
The ALJ's ruling excluding Nelson's polygraph evidence was
made pursuant to his statutory authority to exclude irrelevant
evidence.

Accordingly, this court should defer to the ALJ's

ruling, which was affirmed on agency review, unless it is found
to be clearly unreasonable or an abuse of discretion.

Accord

Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah
2

1991)-

The ALJ's ruling should be given the same degree of

deference as would be given a trial court's ruling on a relevancy
determination under the Utah Rules of Evidence.

See State v.

Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah App. 1991)(trial court has
"broad discretion to determine whether proffered evidence is
relevant, and we will find error only if the trial court has
abused its discretion"); accord State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231
(Utah App. 1989) .

2. IS THE DIVISION'S FINDING THAT NELSON ENGAGED IN
SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH HER PATIENT, K.G., IN 1985
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?
Standard of Review;

The Divisions's finding that Nelson

engaged in sexual relations with K.G. in 1985 constitutes a
finding of fact and should be reviewed by this court to determine
whether the finding is supported by substantial evidence "when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court."

Utah Code

Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g)(1989); accord King v. Industrial Comm'n,
No. 920464-CA, slip op. at 5 (Utah App. March 18, 1993).

In

order for Nelson to challenge the Division's finding she must
first "'marshall the evidence in support of the finding and then
demonstrate that despite the evidence, the . . . findings are so
lacking in support' as to be inadequate under the applicable
standard of review." Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d

3

4 59, 4 64 (Utah App. 1991)(quoting Grace Drilling v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989)).

3. WERE THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE DIVISION AGAINST
NELSON UNREASONABLE IN LIGHT OF HER UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR?
Standard of Review;

The Division has an explicit grant of

discretion to impose a broad range of disciplinary sanctions
against licensees who are found in violation of the statutes and
rules governing their profession. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-16(3)(7), -15, and 58-35-11 (1990).

The court should review the

Division's decision (as modified by the Department) to impose a
disciplinary sanction under the abuse of discretion standard of
review.

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g)(h)(i) (1989).

Therefore, this court should affirm the Division's sanction
unless it is found to be "clearly unreasonable or otherwise an
abuse of discretion."

Johnson Bowles Co. v. Division of

Securities, 829 P.2d 101, 115 (Utah App.)(explicit grant of
discretion vested in executive director to impose sanctions for
violations of securities law reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard of review), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).

4

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Admin. Rule R153-35-5 (1987-88)2
(B)

The Social Worker's Ethical Responsibility to Clients.

(1) Primacy of Client's Interests. The social
worker's primary responsibility is to clients.
(d) The social worker should avoid relationships or
commitments that conflict with the interests of
clients.
(e) The social worker should under no circumstances
engage in sexual activities with clients.
The following statutory provisions are found in Addendum A
of this brief.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-6 (1990)
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-15 (1990)
Utah Code Ann. §58-35-11 (1990)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l (1989)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1992)

2

The administrative rules cited in this brief have remained
unchanged since 1981.
For the convenience of the court, the
Division cites to the 1987-88 rules because that was the first year
administrative rules were published in the Utah Administrative
Code.
5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
At all times relevant to this case, Nelson has been licensed
to practice as a licensed clinical social worker and as a
certified social worker. (R. 67.)

In 1989, the Division

investigated Nelson based on a complaint that she engaged in
sexual relations with a male client, K.G., in 19 85. (Tr. Vol. 1
at 30). On April 14, 1990, a notice of agency action and
petition was served on Nelson. (R. 986-991.)

On November 13,

1991, a formal hearing commenced before the Board of Social Work
("Board") which lasted three days. (R. 6 6.)
As a result of that hearing, the Board found that Nelson
violated Rules of Ethical Conduct R153-35-5(B)(1)(d) and (e) by
engaging in sexual activity with a client and also by being
involved in a relationship or commitment that conflicted with the
best interests of her client. (R. 74-78.)
that Nelson's licenses be revoked.

The Board recommended

However, the Board

recommended that the revocation be stayed in favor of a threeyear suspension of Nelson's license as a clinical social worker,
and a one-year suspension of her license to practice as a
certified social worker. (R. 79.)

The Board recommended that

Nelson submit to individual therapy for an indeterminate length
of time with a therapist that the Board approved and that she
meet with the Board every six months.
6

The Board further

recommended that Nelson complete nine quarter hours of course
work in the areas of professional values and ethics, human growth
and development and clinical practice procedures. (R. 80.)
Moreover, the Board recommended that following Nelson's
suspension, she not be permitted to engage in private practice
and that her practice be supervised by another licensed clinical
social worker who was approved by the Board and who reported
directly to the Board. (R. 80.)

The Board's recommended order

was subsequently approved and adopted by the Division Director,
David E. Robinson, on January 10, 1992. (R. 65, Addendum B.)
Nelson sought agency review of the Division's order with the
Department. (R. 9.)

David Buhler, then serving as the Executive

Director of the Department of Commerce, modified the Division's
order by reducing to six months the terms of suspension on
Nelson's licenses.

Buhler also ordered that after the conclusion

of said suspensions, the licenses be placed on three-years'
probation.

Buhler also modified the Division's order by allowing

Nelson to return to private practice if she successfully
completes probation. (R. 16-17, Addendum C.)

Petitioner then

filed her petition for review of the Department's order imposing
the modified sanctions.

(R. 16-7.)

7

Nelson is presently under no restriction to practice social
work because of this court's order staying the effect of the
sanction until the conclusion of this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Division's main witness, K.G., sought counseling in 1981
at the Summit County Prevention Center for problems associated
with depression and suicidal ideation. (R. 67.)

Nelson, who

worked at the center, was assigned to provide counseling for K.G.
(R. 67.)

K.G. continued to seek counseling with Nelson

intermittently from 1981 to 1985. (R. 67.)
In August, 1984 Nelson left Summit County and began private
practice. (R„ 120.)

In September 1984, K.G. contacted Nelson and

expressed a desire to continue treatment with Nelson but
indicated that he wasn't sure he could afford it.

According to

Nelson, she offered to allow K.G. to provide her with windsurfing
lessons in exchange for some of the treatment. (Tr. Vol. 3 at
533-35.)

The Board found that this bartering agreement was not

well defined and that it was unprofessional in that it created a
social relationship. (R. 74.)

It also found that it fostered

dependency in K.G. and reflected Nelson's failure to manage the
therapeutic relationship and draw proper client/therapist

8

boundaries. (R. 75.)

The Board concluded Nelson's actions

conflicted with K.G's best interests. (R. 75.)
Between September 4, 1984, and July 18, 1985, Nelson
provided 41 hours of counseling in 33 sessions. (R. 67.)

In

return, K.G. paid Nelson $530 and provided 1-2 ski lessons and 36 windsurfing lessons. (R. 67.)

By July 18, 1985, K.G. still

owed Nelson over $1,700, exclusive of the cash and lessons. (Tr.
Vol. 4 at 700.)

However, according to Nelson, she never asked

K.G. for payment and she instructed her billing company not to
bill him. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 700.)
K.G.'s now ex-wife, Ruth Fata, testified that K.G. saw
Nelson often, that he did not always make regular appointments
and that Nelson would make time for him whenever he called. (Tr.
Vol. 2 at 304.)

In 1985, K.G. and Fata were experiencing marital

problems and jointly went to Nelson, who provided marital
counseling. (R. 69.)

Fata testified that K.G. was very dependent

on Nelson. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 315.)

Both K.G. and Fata testified

that during one session Nelson advised them to "split the
sheets," which they interpreted to mean that they should get a
divorce. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 178, Vol. 2 at 302.)

No further marital

counseling was provided to K.G. and Fata by Nelson.

Shortly

after the session, K.G. told Nelson that the marriage was
deteriorating and that he and Fata were separating and filing for
9

divorce. (R. 7 0.) K.G. and Fata were divorced shortly
thereafter.

Fata testified that she believed that Nelson's

counseling was partly responsible for the failure of the
marriage. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 319-20.)

The Social Work Board

concluded that Nelson's marital counseling was improper in
several respects and that she failed to promote the best
interests of K.G. and his wife. (R. 76.)
After separating from his wife, K.G. continued counseling
with Nelson.

Nelson and K.G. went skiing and windsurfing

together several times as part of the bartering arrangement
between Nelson and K.G. (R. 68, 69.)

Nelson's minor son and

daughter went along to the windsurfing lessons and Nelson fixed
picnic lunches. (R. 69.)

Nelson testified that the atmosphere

during the windsurfing lessons was business-like and nonromantic.
(Tr. Vol. 4 at 658.)

However, her son testified that his mother

hugged and kissed K.G. on at least one* of these outings. (Tr.
Vol. 4 at 741.)

K.G. testified that the atmosphere of the

lessons was social, friendly and like a date. (Tr. Vol. 1 at
181. )
Between June 10, 1985, and July 8, 1985, K.G. was depressed,
hopeless and suicidal. (R. 70.)

The last in-office therapy

session was conducted July 18, 1985, after which Nelson began
seeing K.G. socially outside of the office. (R. 70.)
10

Nelson

claimed that therapy had ended on July 18, 1985 and that she had
discussed the termination of therapy with K.G several times. (Tr.
Vol. 3 at 582.)

K.G. testified that before September 1985 Nelson

never told him therapy was over. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 182.)

K.G. also

testified that, just prior to September 1985, therapy in Nelson's
office declined in frequency because he was seeing Nelson more
often in a social setting. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 183.)

K.G. further

testified that he did not consider the social nature of their
meetings to signify an end to the therapeutic relationship
because Nelson continued to discuss therapeutic issues while they
were together. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 183.)
Nelson's therapeutic records (R. 118.) did not reflect that
therapy was terminated on July 18, 1985. (R. 70, 118.)

Several

expert witnesses testified that a therapist's notes should
reflect a formal termination of therapy. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 142, Vol.
3 at 454, Vol. 4 at 762.)

Two of Nelson's own witnesses, both

social workers, testified that Nelson's clinical notes did not
reflect that therapy had been terminated. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 456,
Vol. 4 at 769.)

The Board concluded that Nelson failed to use

proper procedures to terminate a therapist/client relationship.
(R. 77.)

The Board also found that credible evidence supported

its finding that Nelson did not inform K.G. that their
client/therapist relationship was terminated on July 18, 1985,
11

and that there was no evidence that K.G. believed his therapy
with Nelson was terminated. (R. 71.)
Between August and early September 1985, Nelson saw K.G.
socially on a number of occasions. (R. 71.)

In September 1985,

K.G. and Nelson spent a week-long vacation together in Hawaii at
Nelson's condominium. (R. at 71, 7 2.) According to K.G., they
had sexual reflations, confined to oral intercourse, his first
night there.

(Tr. Vol. 1 at 185.)

K.G. testified that they

continued to have oral sex during the week's visit.

According to

K.G., Nelson insisted that their sexual activity be confined to
oral sex and not actual intercourse because she was not divorced.
(Tr. Vol. 1 at 185-6.)

The Board found that "Tbiased on the more

credible evidence presented, Respondent [Nelson] and K.G. slept
together and periodically engaged in conduct which was sexually
intimate in nature.

While no intercourse occurred, rNelson 1 and

K.G. did engage in oral sex . . . ." (R. 7 2.) (Emphasis added).
The Board also noted that they found K.G.'s testimony more
credible than Nelson's. (R. 7 8.)
K.G. testified that, after he and Nelson had sexual
relations, Nelson informed him she would no longer be able to see
him at her office. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 186-7.)

The Board found that

in going to Hawaii with K.G., Nelson had assumed undue

12

responsibility for K.G.'s general welfare and that her behavior
conflicted with K.G's best interests. (R. 77.)
K.G's brother, Kent G., testified that he spoke with K.G. on
a frequent basis in the fall of 1985. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 472.)
According to Kent G., K.G. told him in the fall of 1985 that he
was having a sexual relationship with Nelson. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 473,
474.)

Ruth Fata testified that when she spoke with K.G. in

November 1985, he told her that he had stopped seeing Nelson
because Nelson had told him that she loved him and was leaving
her husband for him. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 307.)

The Board noted that

they found the testimony of Kent G. and Fata credible. (R. 7 8.)
Kathy Lavitt, who met K.G. in the fall 1985, also testified that
K.G. told her he had recently had a sexual relationship with his
therapist. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 153.)
From late October 1985 until the fall of 1988, K.G. did not
have any further contact with Nelson. (R. 7 2.) K.G. and Nelson
met again in 1988. (R. 78.)

Letters were exchanged between

Nelson and K.G., and they spoke occasionally. (Tr. Vol. 4 at
802.) According to Nelson, in the middle of May 1988 she began
to see K.G. socially, and they began having sexual relations.
(Tr. Vol. 4 at 805-6.)

During this same period, Nelson testified

that she asked K.G. to come with her on a visit to Nelson's
therapist in order to discuss their relationship. (Tr. Vol. 4 at
13

807.)

According to K.G., during this visit, Nelson discussed her

feeling that K.G. had abandoned her in 1985. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 202.)
In May or June 1989 K.G. invited Nelson to travel to Oregon
where K.G. was to visit friends. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 195.)

One of

K.G's friends, Carlton Stubing, testified that in Oregon Nelson
told him she and K.G. had a prior involvement and that she was
fearful that he would abandon her. (Tr. Vol, 3 at 484, 490.)
After Nelson left Oregon, she wrote several letters to K.G.
proclaiming her love for him. (R. 89-99.)

Shortly thereafter,

K.G. returned to Utah and admitted himself into the Western
Institute for Neuropsychology ("WIN"), for depression, suicidal
tendencies, and substance abuse. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 105.) While at
WIN, K.G. reluctantly disclosed his past sexual and therapeutic
relationship with Nelson to his therapist at WIN, Peter Brown
("Brown"). (Tr. Vol. 1 at 109.)

Because a sexual relationship

between a therapist and patient violates the social worker's
ethical standards, Brown told K.G. that, if K.G. did not report
the relationship to the Board, he would be obligated to report
Nelson. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 115.) After K.G. made the report, Brown
made a follow-up call to the Board. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 116.)

Brown

testified that the relationship between Nelson and her client was
unethical and unhealthy and that he was gravely concerned about
the effect the relationship had on K.G. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 114.)
14

Brown also testified that he felt the relationship contributed to
K.G.'s problems. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 120.)
The Board concluded that Nelson had engaged in highly
questionable practices in her counseling of K.G. (R. 78.) The
Board also felt that Nelson's professional performance reflected
numerous deficiencies. (R. 79.) The Board decided that Nelson's
conduct with K.G. warranted a severe sanction because of the
"extreme degree of Respondent's departure from generally accepted
ethical standards" and the "adverse consequence which resulted
from that misconduct." (R. 79.) (Emphasis added).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The ALJ's decision to exclude as irrelevant evidence,
Nelson's polygraph examination, which should be afforded
deference by this court, was not unreasonable.

The ALJ's ruling

is consistent with the established principle in this state that,
absent a stipulation from the parties, polygraph evidence is per
se inadmissible in a court of law.

This approach has been

consistently affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court.

No stipulation

existed between Nelson and the Division to admit the polygraph
evidence at the hearing.

Because of the unreliability and

prejudicial nature of polygraph evidence, the ALJ did not abuse
his discretion when he excluded Nelson's polygraph results. The
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reasons for excluding polygraph evidence, i.e., its lack of
scientific reliability and its undue prejudice in comparison to
its probative value, are not obviated simply because the
proceeding is in an administrative forum where the evidentiary
standards are more relaxed than those used in courts.

Licensing

boards are equally susceptible to the inherent problems of
polygraph evidence.

Accordingly, the ALJ's ruling was not an

abuse of discretion.
Moreover, Nelson cannot make the requisite showing that she
was "substantially prejudiced" by the ALJ's decision, even if it
was unreasonable, because the polygraph results are not in the
record.
Nelson next challenges the Division's factual finding that
in September 1985 she engaged in sexual relations with her
client, K.G., while they were together on a vacation in Hawaii.
This finding, first made by the Board, was expressly adopted by
the Division and then affirmed by the Department of Commerce on
agency review.3
3

The proceeding below involved three decisions. First, the
Board heard the evidence and issued its recommended findings of
fact, conclusion of law, and order. The recommended findings,
conclusion and order were then approved and adopted by the Division
Director, David E. Robinson.
The decision then became the
Division's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order.
Subsequently, the Division's findings, conclusions and order were
reviewed by the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce on
agency review. He modified one of the* Division's findings and its
16

The Division's finding has not properly been challenged by
Nelson in this appeal•

Nelson has not met her burden to marshall

all the evidence both in support of, and contrary to, the
Division's finding.

Nelson has failed to marshall critical

evidence that both corroborated the testimony of K.G., the
Division's chief witness, and further bolstered the Division's
finding.

Nelson's failure to marshall the evidence bars her from

challenging the finding.

Accordingly, this court should affirm

the Division's finding as supported by substantial evidence.

The

evidence presented at the formal adjudicative proceeding, when
viewed in light of the whole record, shows that substantial
evidence supports the Division's finding and further demonstrates
the extent to which Nelson has not adequately marshalled the
evidence in this appeal.
Aside from the finding that Nelson engaged in sexual
relations with a client, the Board and the Division also found
that Nelson's general conduct in relation to K.G. was violative

order imposing sanctions.
Cf. La Sal Oil Company, Inc. v.
Department of Envtl. Quality, 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. Dec.
18, 1992). The Division's order here was a final order and not
merely a recommended order that was acted upon by the Department.
Reference to La Sal is to made to avoid confusion over which
decision is being reviewed on appeal.
Here, the Division's
decision (as modified by the Department) is the final order for
purposes of this court's review.

17

of the ethical standards of social work.

Nelson has not

challenged any of the Division's findings with respect to the
other ethical violations cited by the Division which, standing
alone, would justify the disciplinary sanction imposed against
Nelson,
Nelson challenges the severity of the sanction imposed by
the Division, which was subsequently modified by the Department
of Commerce on agency review.

The Division is given broad

discretion to impose disciplinary sanctions against social
workers who violate the statutes and rules that apply to that
profession.

The sanction ultimately imposed by the Department

should be affirmed unless this court finds it to be unreasonable
and, thus, an abuse of discretion.

Nelson does not correctly

identify the standard of review on this issue but merely argues
that the facts do not warrant the sanction imposed by the
Department.

Nelson concedes she made bad decisions with respect

to K.G. in 1985, but attempts to argue mitigation because she has
not had any complaints brought against her since 19 85.

Nelson's

argument does not justify overturning the sanction because no
abuse of discretion has been shown.

Nelson's behavior towards

K.G. was egregious and inexcusable.

The record as a whole

supports the sanction that was imposed against Nelson.
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Nelson

has not shown that the sanction imposed against her is an abuse
of discretion warranting reversal or modification by this court.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE ALJ DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BY
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF NELSON'S POLYGRAPH
EXAMINATION.
Nelson challenges the ALJ's ruling (R. 180-193) to exclude
evidence of Nelson's polygraph examination on the basis that the
ruling "is not consistent with the somewhat relaxed rules of
evidence that apply at administrative proceedings." (Br. at 11.)
The ALJ's authority to make this ruling is provided for in
section 63-46b-8(1)(b)(1), which gives the ALJ an explicit grant
of discretion to exclude irrelevant evidence.

Because the ALJ is

given an explicit grant of discretion to exclude irrelevant
evidence, the appellate standard of review for this issue is
governed by section § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). Accordingly, this
court should grant relief to Nelson only if it concludes that the
ALJ's decision was an abuse of discretion or was beyond the
"bounds of reasonableness," and that Nelson was substantially
prejudiced as a result.

King, slip op. at 5.

Nelson has not established, let alone argued, that the ALJ
abused his discretion by excluding her polygraph evidence.
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Moreover, Nelson has not shown and cannot show that she suffered
substantial prejudice as a result of the ALJ's ruling because
there is no evidence in the record (or any citation to a proffer)
that would show that the polygraph evidence, had it been
admitted, would have favorably affected the outcome of
proceedings below.

Consequently, there are two good reasons why

the court should deny Nelson's requested relief in this appeal.

1. THE ALJ'S RULING WAS REASONABLE BECAUSE,
AS UTAH COURTS HAVE HELD, POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
IS SCIENTIFICALLY UNRELIABLE AND UNDULY
PREJUDICIAL.
Polygraph evidence has consistently been deemed as
incompetent, scientifically unreliable and unduly prejudicial
evidence by Utah courts.

See State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 37

(Utah 1989)("a stipulation between the State and the accused is
presently required for the admission of polygraph test results");
accord State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 397-98 (Utah 1989); State
v. Rebetrano, 681 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1984); State v. Abel, 600 P.2d
994 (Utah 1979) .
There was no stipulation between the Division and Nelson to
admit the results of her polygraph examination.

Consequently,

the ALJ did not abuse his discretion by excluding Nelson's
polygraph evidence because his ruling correctly adheres to the
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current state of the law dealing with polygraph evidence as
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court.
While Nelson recognizes the current rule governing the use
of polygraph evidence in criminal and civil proceedings, (Br. at
11), Nelson urges that a different rule should apply to
administrative proceedings because of the relaxed evidentiary
standards of such proceedings. (Br. at 12.) Although strict
adherence to the Utah Rules of Evidence is not required in
administrative proceedings, see Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 818
P.2d 23, 28 (Utah App. 1991), there is no justification for a
variation in the Utah rule simply because the polygraph evidence
is offered in an administrative proceeding.

The underlying

rationale for the Utah rule requiring exclusion of polygraph
evidence absent a stipulation, i.e., scientific unreliability and
undue prejudice, is not abrogated because the evidence is used in
an administrative proceeding.

Simply put, polygraph evidence is

not more reliable and less prejudicial because it is used in an
administrative proceeding.
In Eldredqe, the Utah Supreme Court explained that "the
reason for this rule is that polygraph data has not been shown to
be sufficiently reliable to justify the tendency of a fact finder
to be overawed by the test results and too willing to abdicate
its difficult truth-finding function to an expert and his or her
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machine." 733 P.2d at 37 (citing State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1209,
1212 (Utah 1987)); Abel, 600 P.2d at 998). Because the present
status of polygraph evidence remains unchanged, there is no
reasonable justification for allowing it to be admitted into
evidence at an administrative proceeding.

The risk that a

license board would be overawed by the test results and abdicate
its fact finding function to a polygraph machine is the same that
exists in a jury or bench trial4 in a criminal or civil
proceeding.
Numerous cases from other jurisdictions have consistently
upheld the exclusion of polygraph evidence in administrative
hearings.

For example, in Thangavelu v. Department of Licensing

and Regulation, 386 N.W. 2d 584, 587 (Mich. App. 1986), the
Michigan Court of Appeals held that a hearing officer's decision
in a license revocation proceeding not to admit the results of a
complainant's polygraph test was not an abuse of discretion.

See

also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Wittmaack, 522 A.2d 522
(Pa. 1987) (polygraph evidence held inadmissible in bar
disciplinary proceeding because polygraph evidence is not
scientifically reliable and lacked objective trustworthiness).
A

The Division could not find any authority that would
indicate a variation in the rule depending on whether the polygraph
evidence was being offered before a judge or a jury. The inherent
problems with polygraph evidence require the same result in either
case.
22

The Supreme Court of California also ruled that polygraph
examination evidence is inadmissible in a state bar disciplinary
proceeding, absent a stipulation•

Arden v. State Bar of

California, 739 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Cal. 1987); see also Kaske v.
Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, 450 N.E.2d 314 (111,
1983) .
Whether polygraph evidence is offered as evidence in an
administrative hearing or court trial, it is unreliable and
inherently prejudicial and must be excluded absent a waiver or
stipulation to its admissibility.

The ALJ's ruling to exclude

this evidence was not an abuse of discretion.

2. NELSON CANNOT SHOW SHE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED
BY THE EXCLUSION OF THE POLYGRAPH RESULTS BECAUSE THAT
EVIDENCE IS NOT IN THE RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT.
Nelson has not shown that the ALJ's ruling to exclude her
polygraph evidence was an abuse of discretion.

Moreover, even if

the ALJ's ruling is found to be an abuse of discretion, Nelson is
still required under section 63-46b-16(4) to demonstrate that she
was "substantially prejudiced" as result of the exclusion of the
polygraph evidence.

The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted

section 63-46b-16(4)'s "substantial prejudice" test as the same
standard used for determining whether harmless error has occurred
in judicial proceedings.

Morton, 814 P.2d at 584. An error is
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considered harmless if "it is sufficiently inconsequential that
. . . there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected
the outcome of the proceedings." Id.
No analysis under the substantial prejudice standard can be
initiated in this case because the content of the excluded
polygraph evidence has not been made part of the record.

Nelson

has not tried to argue substantial prejudice, nor can she argue
that the exclusion of the polygraph evidence was prejudicial
because it is not part of the record.

Without the excluded

evidence itself or an adequate proffer of it contents, this court
cannot determine whether there was substantial prejudice, even if
it concluded that the polygraph results should have admitted at
the administirative hearing.

See Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621

P.2d 1240, 1243 (Utah 1980); Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakenev
Corp., 578 P«2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978).
Nelson has not shown that the ALJ abused his discretion, nor
can she show that the exclusion of the polygraph evidence
resulted in substantial prejudice.

Accordingly, this court is

unable to grant Nelson relief under section 63-46b-16(4).
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II.
NELSON'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE
PRECLUDES HER FROM CHALLENGING THE DIVISION'S
FINDING THAT SHE ENGAGED IN SEXUAL RELATIONS
WITH K.G..
The only factual finding Nelson contests on appeal is the
Division's finding that she engaged in sexual relations with K.G.
in 1985 while Nelson and K.G. were in Hawaii. (Br. at 15.)
The Division's factual finding should be reviewed by this court
to determine whether the finding is supported by substantial
evidence "when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g)(1989). Accord King,
slip op. at 5 (Utah App. March 18f 1993).

As the appellant,

Nelson has the burden to marshall the evidence "'in support

of

the findings and then demonstrate that despite the evidence, the
. . . findings are so lacking in support' as to be inadequate
under the applicable standard of review."

Heinecke, 810 P.2d at

464 (citing Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68) (emphasis in the
original).

The marshalling requirement imposes a "heavy burden"

on the appellant. Id.
Nelson has ignored or simply failed to understand her burden
on this appeal to marshall all of the evidence that supports or
contradicts the Division's finding on this factual issue.
Nelson's statement of facts (Br. 5-10) and her argument (Br. 1517) is unquestionably one-sided and appears to be an attempt to
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portray K.G.'s testimony in a negative light while
overemphasizing Nelson's testimony and self-serving version of
events.

Nelson overlooks or ignores critical portions of

evidence that both support the Division's finding and rebut
Nelson's testimony.

Because she has failed to marshall all of

the evidence that supports the Division's finding, Nelson is
barred from challenging the Division's finding.

Accordingly, the

court should affirm the Division's finding and conclusion that
Nelson engaged in unethical conduct by engaging in sexual
relations with a client in 1985.
The burden of marshalling the evidence does not lie with the
Division.

However, because Nelson has not marshalled the

evidence, the Division is compelled to demonstrate briefly for
this court that there is substantial evidence in the record that
supports the Division's finding.

1. THE DIVISION'S FINDING THAT NELSON
ENGAGED IN SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH K.G. IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The Division found that Nelson engaged in sexual relations
with K.G. in September of 1985 while they were still involved in
a client/therapist relationship.

The Board's recommended order

states, "Based on the more credible evidence presented,
Respondent and K.G. slept together and periodically engaged in
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conduct which was sexual in nature.

While no intercourse

occurred, Respondent and K.G. did engage in oral sex, . ." (R.
72)(emphasis added).

The Division's finding supported the

conclusion that Nelson violated Utah Administrative Codef R15335-5(B)(l)(e)(1987-88).
Nelson argues that the "sole basis" for the Division's
finding that Nelson engaged in sexual relations with K.G. in 1985
was K.G.'s testimony. (Br. at 15). Nelson claims that K.G.'s
testimony does not support the Division's finding because the
Board partially rejected K.G.'s description of what took place at
Hawaii. (Br. at 16.)

Nelson urges that the Board's statement to

the effect that "there is a lack of credible evidence to find
that the conduct of took place as specifically described by
K.G.," is inconsistent with its finding that credible evidence
supported the fact that K.G. and Nelson engaged in sexual
relations in 1985. (Br. at 16.) 5
Although the question of credibility between the respective
testimonies of K.G. and Nelson is important because only K.G. and

5

In Nelson's brief at page 14, Nelson directs the court's
attention to the unique "details" of K.G.'s testimony (which the
Board found was not supported by credible evidence) concerning the
sexual relationship that transpired in Hawaii in 1985. The Board's
statement to the effect that did not believe K.G.'s version of
events in their entirety does not preclude them from finding that
there was sufficient evidence to conclude that sexual relations did
in fact occur.
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Nelson had actual knowledge of what transpired in Hawaii, Nelson
fails to account for the fact that the Board found K.G.'s
testimony to be more credible than her own.6 (R. 7 8.) While the
Board did not completely credit K.G.'s account of occurred at
Hawaii, that does preclude the Board from finding that sexual
relations occurred while Nelson and K.G. spent the week together
in Hawaii in 1985.
K.G.'s testimony was corroborated by several witnesses who
had independent recollection of conversations with K.G. in 1985
concerning K.G.'s sexual relationship with Nelson.

Nelson claims

that Board erred in finding that K.G.'s testimony was
corroborated by the testimony of K.G.'s brother and ex-wife
because K.G. testified that he told no one of his sexual
involvement with Nelson until 1990. Nelson has mischaracterized
K.G.'s testimony.

On cross-examination, K.G. was asked, "Isn't

it true that you never told anybody the details of this alleged
sexual encounter until 1990?"

K.G. responded, "It wouldn't

6

The Board did not find Nelson's testimony to be credible in
most respects.
For example, the Board did not believe Nelson's
testimony (Tr. Vol. 3 at 582) that she had ended the
client/therapist relationship with K.G. before the Hawaii trip. (R.
71.) The Board also heard Nelson's own minor son testify that he
saw Nelson and K.G. kissing and hugging on at least two occasions
at Nelson's home and when Nelson went windsurfing with K.G. (Tr.
Vol. 4 at 736, 741). This was contrary to Nelson's testimony (Tr.
Vol. 3 at 606, 612, 617) that there was no hugging, kissing, or
intimate physical contact between K.G. and herself in 1985. (R.
72. )
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surprise me at all if I hadn't." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 261.)

K.G. did

not testify that he had not discussed his sexual involvement with
anyone until 1990. His response to the question can only be
properly characterized as a lack of recollection of discussing
the "details" of his sexual involvement with Nelson in Hawaii.
The question put to K.G. was phrased in general terms.

If K.G.

had been asked whether he discussed his sexual involvement with
his brother or his ex-wife, a totally different response may have
been given.
K.G.'s brother, Kent G., (Tr. Vol. 3 at

474), his ex-wife,

Fata, (Tr. Vol. 2 at 306-308), and Kathy Lavitt all testified
that K.G. told them in 1985 that he had a sexual or a romantic
relationship with his therapist in 1985. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 153.)
Another witness, Stubing, testified that Nelson told him in 1989
that she had a prior involvement with K.G. and was afraid that
K.G. would abandon her again. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 484, 490.)

Nelson's

failure to marshall evidence relative to the testimony of Fata,
Kent G., Lavitt and Stubing exemplifies how Nelson has not met
her burden on this appeal.
In addition, there is other evidence that corroborates
K.G.'s testimony and supports the Division's finding that Nelson
engaged in a sexually intimate relationship with K.G. in 1985/
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including several letters Nelson wrote to K.G. between 19 88 and
1989 that were admitted into evidence. (R. 82-99.)7
The letters, coupled with the corroborating testimony of the
Division's witnesses, support the Division's finding that Nelson
engaged in sexual relations with K.G. in 1985. While the
testimony of the corroborating witnesses does not go directly to
the finding that sex occurred during the Hawaii trip, the
testimony does lend credence to K.G.'s testimony that Nelson's
relationship with K.G. in 1985 transcended the bounds of a
professional therapeutic relationship and became a sexually
intimate and romantic relationship.

The evidence, when viewed in

light of the whole record, shows that substantial evidence
supports the Division's finding.
These letters are never mentioned by Nelson in this appeal.
The letters were critical to the Division's case to show that the
relationship that existed between Nelson and K.G. in 1985 was
sexually intimate or romantic in nature. For example, the first
letter, dated October 21, 1988, was written after Nelson had not
seen K.G. since October of 1985. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 778.) The letter
was written to K.G. after K.G. dropped out of sight for a period of
three years. This letter corroborates K.G.'s testimony that the
relationship he had with Nelson in 1985 went beyond the
client/therapist relationship and turned to a romantic and sexual
one. The next letter written by Nelson to K.G. was dated December
19, 1988. (R. 85.) This letter also corroborates K.G.'s testimony.
In that letter Nelson, referring back to 1985, writes, "Although I
have many more feelings and thoughts about our 'relationship' I
just couldn't bring myself to risk by expressing them." (R. at 8586.)
(quotes in original). The letters were important to the
Division's case and were used to corroborate K.G.'s testimony
concerning the sexual relationship that transpired between Nelson
and K.G. in 1985.
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2. EVEN IF THERE WAS NO FINDING THAT NELSON ENGAGED IN
SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH HER CLIENT K.G. IN 1985, NELSON
STILL ENGAGED IN UNETHICAL CONDUCT TOWARD HER CLIENT
THAT WARRANTS THE SANCTION IMPOSED.
Ignoring, for the sake of argument, the Division's finding
that Nelson engaged in sexual relations with K.G. in 1985, the
Board still found other instances of unethical conduct that
Nelson committed while acting as K.G.'s therapist.

Nelson has

elected not to challenge those findings and conclusions.
The Division found that Nelson violated Utah Administrative
Code Rule 153-35-5(B)(1)(d), which provides that "the social
worker should avoid relationships or commitments that conflict
with the interests of clients."

The Board found that Nelson

"engaged in unethical conduct violative of R153-35-5(B)(1)(d) in
various instances." (R. 74.)

The non-sex related violations were

just as serious as the violation of the rule prohibiting sexual
relations with a client.

For example, the Board found that

Nelson engaged in unethical behavior by the nature of the
bartering agreement between Nelson and K.G.

While the bartering

agreement was not viewed as being unethical per se, the Board
found that the bartering agreement was not well defined and that
it created a social relationship between K.G and Nelson (R. 74,
75.)

The Board also found that the nature of the bartering

agreement conflicted with K.G.'s best interests and reflected on
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Nelson's "failure to manage the therapeutic relationship in such
a way as that the proper boundaries of that relationship were
clearly understood by the client." (R. 75.)
The Board also concluded that, because of the extended
therapeutic relationship between K.G. "coupled with the
inappropriate bartering agreement," Nelson "failed to promote the
best interests of the marriage between K.G. and his wife." (R.
76.)

The Board found that Nelson should not have provided joint

marital counseling and that "the nature of the therapy she did
provide was not consistent with the interests of both clients."
(R. 76.)
Finally, even ignoring the sexual involvement that occurred
in 1985 in Hawaii, the fact that Nelson went to Hawaii with her
client was clearly unethical and demonstrates Nelson's
unprofessional conduct towards K.G. which, according to the
Board, conflicted with K.G.'s best interests. (R. 78.)

III.
THE SANCTION AGAINST NELSON WAS REASONABLE IN
VIEW OF THE EGREGIOUS NATURE OF NELSON'S
UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR.
The Division's order and the Department's subsequent
modification of the Division's order on agency review, are set
forth in this brief as Addendum Items B and C.
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The sanction

imposed should not be disturbed by this court unless Nelson shows
that it is clearly unreasonable or otherwise an abuse of
discretion.

Johnson Bowles Co,, 829 P.2d at 115.

In her brief at pages 18-20, Nelson challenges the
Department's suspension of her license to practice social work on
the grounds that the sanction imposed is unduly harsh and
unjustified.

Nelson asks this court to nullify the suspension in

its entirety.

(Br. at 21.)

The Division finds Nelson's argument on this issue
confusing.

Nelson states:

Assuming arguendo that Licensee Nelson did allow a
social relationship to exist with K.G. after she had
stopped seeing him in her office, that would provide a
basis for discipline. Similarly, the bartering
agreement, due to its vague nature and personal service
aspects, may also provide a basis upon which the
Division could sanction Licensee. Nonetheless,
Licensee urges this court to find that the sanctions
imposed by the division are unduly harsh given her
conduct.
(Br. at 20.) All assuming at this point is over, since the
Division did find that Nelson developed a social and sexual
relationship with K.G. (R. 72.) Moreover, the Division found
that, as a result of Nelson's unprofessional conduct, K.G. was
adversely impacted "in his ability to trust therapy and
subsequently obtain counseling from other therapists." (R. 73.)
Nelson concedes that she made a "poor decision" to meet K.G.
in Hawaii and "allowed the social relationship with K.G. to
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exceed the appropriate boundaries." (Br. at 21.)

Based on what

the Division found and what Nelson admits to, a six-month
suspension coupled with the conditions imposed against Nelson
does not rise to an abuse of discretion.

Nelson's conduct

towards K.G., when viewed in its entirety, manifests an egregious
departure from the ethical and professional standards of social
work.

As a licensed mental health professional, Nelson was in a

position of trust and control.

She blatantly abused that trust

and engaged in a relationship with K.G that was clearly unethical
and adverse to K.G.'s best interests.
In addition, the fact that Nelson's unprofessional conduct
occurred in 1985 does not justify a lesser sanction.

See Rogers

v. Division of Real Estate, 790 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah App. 1990)
(license revocation of real estate broker in December 1988 for
1982 conduct not unduly harsh, even where licensee had no further
complaints against her).

Consequently, the sanction that was

imposed against Nelson was reasonable, was not an abuse of
discretion, and should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this court should lift the stay and
affirm the Department's final order suspending Nelson's licenses
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to practice as a certified and clinical social worker and
imposing other terms and restrictions against her licenses.
Submitted this / v V / day of the April, 1993.
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ADDENDUM A

Utah Code Ann, § 58-1-6 (1990):
The duties, functions, and responsibilities of the
division include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(3)taking administrative and judicial action against
persons in violation of the laws and rules administered
and enforced by the division, including, but not
limited to, the issuance of cease and desist orders;

(7) issuing, refusing to issue, revoking, suspending,
renewing, refusing to renew, or otherwise acting upon
any license or licenseef•]
Utah Code Ann- § 58-1-15 (1990):
The division may refuse to issue or renew, and may
suspend or revoke the license of any licensee who:
(1) is or has been guilty of unprofessional conduct, as
defined by statute or rule[.]
Utah Code Ann. §58-35-11 (1990):
The division may refuse to renew, or may suspend or
revoke any license issued under this chapter upon
proof, after a hearing, that the licensee has engaged
in unprofessional conduct. As used in this chapter,
"unprofessional conduct" includes, but is not limited
to:

(6)being found guilty of unprofessional conduct by the rules
established by the Division,
Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-l (1989).
chapter:

Scope and applicability of

(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except
as otherwise provided by a statute superseding
provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to

this chapter, the provisions of this chapter apply to
every agency of the state of Utah and govern:
(a) all state agency actions that determine the legal
rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal
interests of one or more identifiable persons,
including all agency actions to grant, deny, revoke,
suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an
authority, right, or license; and
(b) judicial review of all such actions.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 (1989). Procedures for formal
adjudicative proceedings - Hearing procedure
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i)
and (ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a
hearing shall be conducted as follows:

(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the
presiding officer:

(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant,
immaterial, or unduly repetitious;
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989).
adjudicative proceedings.

Judicial review - Formal

(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final
agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency
action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings,
the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in
the form required by the appellate rules of the
appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate
court shall govern all additional filings and
proceedings in the appellate court.

(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied
the law;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency
by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless
the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts
and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis
for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals
from the district court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service
Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands,
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state
engineer[.]

ADDENDUM B

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
TERESA L. NELSON
TO PRACTICE AS A CERTIFIED AND
CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

O R D E R
Case No. OPL-90-26

The attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommended Order are hereby adopted by the Director of the
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing of the State of
Utah.

Respondent's licenses are thus suspended, effective thirty

(30) days from the date of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the suspended licenses, both wall
and wallet sizes, as well as the embossed certificate, thus be
surrendered to the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing.

Dated this

/O^

day of January, 1992,

tCL.,.j&<£t

'7

David E. Rpl5im s o n
Director"^

Native review of this Order may be obtained by
i£tfest for agency review with the executive director of
g^iitent within thirty (3 0) days after issuance of this
Any such request must comply with the requirements of the
Order
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-12(l) and R151-46b-12 of the departmental
rules which govern agency review.

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
TERESA L. NELSON
TO PRACTICE AS A CERTIFIED AND
CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

:
FINDINGS OF FACT
:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
: AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
:
: CASE NO. OPL-90-26

Appearances:
Melissa M. Hubbell for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
Suzanne M. Dallimore for Respondent
BY THE BOARD:
Pursuant to notice duly served by certified mail, a hearing
was conducted in the above-entitled matter on November 13-14,
1991 and was then resumed and completed on December 4, 1991
before J- Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the
Department of Commerce, and the Board of Social Work Examiners.
Board members present for the hearing were Eugene Gibbons, Ann M.
Talbot, Patricia Gamble-Hovey, Jennifer Bartell and Mary
Bearnson.

David E. Robinson, the Director of the Division of

Occupational and Professional Licensing, was also present.
Thereafter, evidence was received.

During the first day of

the hearing, Ms. Gamble-Hovey was recused from further
participation in both the hearing and subsequent deliberation by
the Board in this proceeding.

The Board, being fully advised in

the premises, now enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondent is, and at times relevant to these

proceedings has been, licensed to practice as a certified and
clinical social worker in the State of Utah.

The record does not

reflect when Respondent was licensed as a certified social
worker, although she was employed in that capacity at the Summit
County Prevention Center in 1980 and subsequently became the
director of that facility.

Respondent obtained her license as a

clinical social worker in 1983, she left the Center in June 1984
and then commenced a full-time private practice as a clinical
social worker with Affiliated Psychotherapists.
2.

Commencing sometine late in 1981, Respondent provided

counseling to a client, referred to herein as K.G., for problems
associated with depression, suicidal ideation, alcohol and
substance abuse.

Counseling continued for a number of months,

often on a weekly basis, and charges for Respondent's services
were based on a sliding fee schedule.

Given his limited

financial ability, K.G. was required to make only nominal
payments for Respondent's services.

K.G. subsequently left

treatment sometime in 1982 and he married in 1983.
3.

On September 4, 1984, K.G. commenced treatment with

Respondent, who provided approximately forty-one (41) hours of
counseling over thirty-three (33) sessions with K.G. through July
18, 1985.

Those sessions addressed K.G.'s alcohol abuse, major

depressive episodes, dysphoric mood, loss of interest and energy,
feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness, diminished ability to
think or concentrate, indecisiveness, suicidal ideation and his
2

recurrent thoughts of death.
4.

Between December 7, 1984 and April 9, 1985, K.G. paid

Respondent a total of $530 as partial compensation for the
therapy sessions.

When K.G. had resumed counseling with

Respondent in 1984f they agreed he would subsequently provide ski
and windsurfing lessons to Respondent as compensation for her
services.

Beyond the above-stated cash payments, Respondent and

K.G. apparently understood that one ski or windsurfing lesson
would be exchanged for each therapy session.
5.

When Respondent and K.G. agreed to barter their

servicesf Respondent normally charged $55 for a one (1) hour
session.

No discussion occurred between Respondent and K.G. as

to what the latter would normally charge for lessons he would
providef no common understanding existed as to the duration of
their bartering agreement and Respondent believed the lessons she
received from K.G. would only operate to pay for some of her
counseling services.
6.

Respondent had previously bartered her services with two

other clients to obtain a single ski lesson on one occasion and,
in other instance, piano lessons for her children.

In each case,

the value of the respective services to be exchanged was
initially discussed between Respondent and her client and each
party to the agreement understood the extent of services which
would be bartered.
7.

Between September 4, 1984 and July 18, 1985, K.G.

provided Respondent with 1-2 ski lessons and 3-6 windsurfing
lessons.

During one of the ski lessons, K.G. provided little 3

if any - instruction on skiing techniques to Respondent, he spoke
to Respondent of family ski outings with his parents when he was
a child and generally considered the time he spent with
Respondent during the lesson as similar to that of a therapy
session.

As she testified during this proceeding, Respondent's

interaction with K.G. at that time was consistent with the
Rogarian approach she might use in therapy sessions with a
client.
8.

K.G. is a certified windsurfing instructor and has

offered such lessons to other individuals.

Respondent's two

children often accompanied her and K.G. when the latter provided
windsurfing lessons. Respondent usually brought a picnic lunch
on those occasions.

Such conduct created a social atmosphere

unlike that present during windsurfing lessons K.G. has offered
to other individuals at other times.
9.

During therapy sessions in early 1985, K.G. periodically

informed Respondent of conflicts with his wife, who was initially
reluctant to participate in marriage counseling.

During two

sessions in February 1985, K.G. told Respondent his wife had
agreed to start such counseling and he expressed hope his
marriage would continue.
10.
wife.

On February 26, 1985, Respondent met only with K.G.'s

Respondent then held two co-joint counseling sessions on

March 5 and 19, 1985. Respondent believed many unalterable
conflicts existed in the marriage and she inquired of both K.G.
and his wife if they had considered obtaining a divorce.
on the credible evidence presented, both K.G. and his wife
4

Based

believed Respondent had thus suggested they should be divorced.
No further co-joint sessions were conducted.

During K.G.'s next

session on April 9, 1985f Respondent noted K.G.'s marital
relationship appeared to be deteriorating, K.G. told Respondent
he was depressed and informed her that he was considering a
divorce.
11.

During the next counseling session on May 28, 1985f

K.G. informed Respondent that he and his wife were separated and
filing for a divorce.

When K.G. also told Respondent he was

depressedf she decided to commence hypnosis and utilize age
regression techniques to obtain more information regarding K.G.'s
lack of nurturing and his ability to self-nurture.
12.

Respondent used hypnosis and age regression techniques

during eight (8) counseling sessions with K.G. between May 31,
1985 and July 18, 1985.

During a June 10, 1985 session, K.G.

expressed sadness regarding his divorce and indicated he felt
empty and suicidal.

During a July 8, 1985 session, Respondent

related he had attempted suicide the night before his wife left
and he was tired of not feeling good.

He also expressed a sense

of hopelessness, sadness and frustration.
13.

The last formal therapy session Respondent provided to

K.G. was conducted in her office on July 18, 1985.

Respondent

used hypnosis during that session, she noted K.G. lacked
direction in his career goals and he was chemically more stable.
Respondent recommended K.G. continue with his existing
medication.

Clinical notes from Respondent's records do not

reflect she terminated K.G. as a client at that time.
5

14.

Based on the more credible evidence presented,

Respondent did not inform K.G. the client/therapist relationship
was terminated on July 18, 1985 and there is no evidence K.G.
believed his status as a client ended after that therapy session.
Based on the more credible evidence, and given the relatively
indefinite manner in which Respondent had obtained compensation
for the services she had provided to K.G. since September 1984,
there was no agreement between them to end his therapy based on
any concern he would be unable to pay for ongoing treatment.

A

review of Respondent's clinical notes does not reflect K.G. had
progressed in counseling as to no longer require therapy.
15.

Between mid-August 1985 and early-September 1985,

Respondent and K.G. socialized on three occasions.

Specifically,

they played tennis and K.G. twice visited Respondent at her home.
During that second visit in early September 1985, Respondent
informed K.G. she was leaving for a vacation in Hawaii on
September 15, 1985.

There is a lack of sufficient evidence to

find that Respondent invited K.G. to join her.

However,

Respondent told K.G. she would be staying in a condominium while
there, she informed him of both the length of her trip and her
scheduled departure and further indicated she would have access
to a rental car.
16.

A few days prior to her departure for Hawaii, K.G.

informed Respondent he had purchased an airline ticket and
inquired if he could join her.

Respondent agreed, she arrived in

Hawaii on September 15, 1985 and met K.G. at the airport when he
arrived that same day on a subsequent flight.
6

They stayed in

Hawaii for approximately one week and spent a majority of their
time together.

Based on the more credible evidence presented,

Respondent and K.G. slept together and periodically engaged in
conduct which was sexually intimate in nature.

While no

intercourse occurred, Respondent and K.G. did engage in oral sex,
although there is a lack of credible evidence to find that such
conduct took place as specifically described by K.G. during the
instant proceeding.
17.

Respondent and K.G. left Hawaii on separate flights.

During the following month until late-October 1985, they were
together on four additional occasions.

Specifically, Respondent,

her two children and K.G. had dinner at Respondents home in
late-September 1985, K.G. arrived drunk and unannounced at
Respondent's home one night, they met at a soccer game
approximately one week later and they also had dinner at a
restaurant in late-October 1985.

Based on the more credible

evidence, Respondent and K.G. briefly kissed and hugged at least
one of those occasions, but they did not engage in any sexual
activity other than what had occurred in Hawaii during the
previous month.
19.

Respondent and K.G. had no contact of any nature from

late-October 1985 until the fall of 1988 and their
client/therapist relationship ceased to exist after late-October
1985.

Based on the more credible evidence presented, that

relationship did not resume at any time during subsequent contact
which occurred between Respondent and K.G. from the fall of 1988
through mid-1989.
7

20.

K.G. obtained outpatient alcohol rehabilitative

treatment for three weeks in Oregon during mid-1989*

On July 31,

1989, K.G. commenced inpatient therapy at the Western Institute
of Neuropsychiatry in Utah to address both his alcohol dependency
and a suicide attempt.

K.G. was subsequently referred to another

therapist for further counseling and he has been receiving such
therapy during the past two years.
21.

Based on the credible evidence presented, K.G. has

blamed himself for the relationship which existed with
Respondent, he has been somewhat traumatized by his recollection
of certain aspects of that relationship and he encountered some
difficulty in subsequently discussing that relationship with
other therapists.

Given his feelings of guilt, betrayal and

self-condemnation, K.G. was adversely impacted - to some degree in his ability to trust therapy and subsequently obtain
counseling from other therapists.

This record does not reflect

the current state of K.G.'s mental health or the degree of
progress he may have realized in counseling during the past two
years with his present therapist.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent acknowledges she exercised poor judgment when she
allowed K.G. to join her in Hawaii.

However, Respondent contends

she never engaged in any conduct which conflicted with K.G.'s
interests and she did not misuse her professional relationship as
his therapist for her own personal gain.

Respondent further

asserts their client/therapist relationship ceased prior to the
Hawaiian vacation and did not subsequently resume.
8

Respondent

thus urges no basis exists to enter any disciplinary sanction as
to her license*
Section 58-35-11, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended,
provides the Division may suspend or revoke the license of a
certified or clinical social worker if the licensee has engaged
in unprofessional conduct.

Section 58-3 5-11(6) defines

unprofessional conduct to include a violation of rules
established by the Division.

R153-35-5(B)(1) generally sets

forth that the social worker's primary ethical responsibility is
to clients.

That rule further provides:

(d) The social worker should avoid
relationships or commitments that conflict
with the interests of clients.
(e) The social worker should under no
circumstances engage in sexual activities
with clients.
Respondent engaged in unethical conduct violative of R15335-5(B)(1)(d) in various instances.

The Board initially notes

that, while Respondent agreed to exchange counseling services for
lessons from K.G., the bartering of her services does not - in
and of itself - constitute unprofessional conduct within the
meaning of R153-35-5(B)(1)(d). However, it is evident the
agreement between Respondent and K.G. was not well defined and no
clear understanding existed as to the scope and duration of that
agreement.
Further, the agreement between Respondent and K.G. was not
typical of bartering agreements Respondent had made with other
clients.

It is particularly disturbing that Respondent agreed

to receive a direct personal service from K.G., the nature and
9

duration of which established a social relationship between them.
On at least one occasion during a lesson, Respondent and K.G.
interacted in a manner similar to that which had occurred during
any given therapy session.

Such conduct was not congruent with

either K.G.'s or Respondent's role in a mere instructor/ student
relationship.

The resulting dual relationship which existed

necessarily presented some confusion to K.G.
Moreover, given K.G.'s existing problems with alcoholism and
Respondent's diagnosis of his mental condition, it is critically
significant she failed to understand and appreciate K.G. would
thus tend to develop increasing dependency on her as his
therapist.

The nature of the bartering agreement between

Respondent and K.G. also fostered such dependency and reflects
Respondent's further failure to manage the therapeutic
relationship in such a way that the proper boundaries of that
relationship were clearly understood by the client.
Had Respondent carefully evaluated K.G.'s condition, she
would have properly understood the nature of the dynamics he
brought to the therapy relationship and she should have
necessarily avoided engaging in pleasureable activities with K.G.
in a socialized setting.

There is no evidence Respondent acted

with malicious intent to K.G.'s detriment or that her conduct was
only self-serving in nature. However, Respondent either did not
adequately evaluate or she disregarded the nature of K.G.'s
condition and thus interacted with him in a manner which
conflicted with his best interests.
Given the extended duration of therapy Respondent had
10

provided to K.G. prior to early 1985f coupled with the
inappropriate bartering agreement which existed, Respondent also
failed to promote the best interests of the marriage between K.G.
and his wife.

They could have reasonably understood Respondent

had advised them to obtain a divorce. While Respondent did not
intend to direct them toward such action, the counseling she
offered to them was ambiguous and she should have scrupulously
avoided any uncertainty as to whether she was advising them to
end their marriage.
The nature of co-joint counseling Respondent offered was
particularly disconcerting to K.G.'s wifef who was also her
client and had informed Respondent she wanted her marriage to
remain intact.

K.G.'s wife was aware of the existence and nature

of the bartering agreement between K.G. and Respondent.

Such

knowledge caused her to reasonably believe that an alliance and
socialization existed between Respondent and K.G. which, in turn,
hindered her ability to candidly discuss marital problems with
Respondent toward possible improvement in her marriage.

Under

such circumstances, Respondent should not have provided any cojoint marriage counseling and the nature of the therapy she did
offer was not consistent with the interests of both clients.
Given K.G.'s dependency on Respondent as his therapist, he
perceived the contact between them which arose from the bartering
agreement to be beneficial to him in a therapeutic sense, even
though Respondent may not have either recognized or intended that
result.

However, the enhanced dependency created by the nature

of the bartering agreement was not proper.
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Furthermore, the

continuing interaction between Respondent and K.G. which occurred
in social settings after July 18, 1985 improperly tended to
sustain K.G. in a therapeutic sense and confirmed his ongoing
belief that a client/therapist relationship continued to exist.
All credible evidence suggests that no basis existed to
terminate the just-stated relationship in mid-July 1985, no such
termination actually occurred and, in light of his condition at
that time, it would have not been in K.G.'s best interest to
terminate that relationship.

Ironically, Respondent should have

continued to provide formal therapy to K.G. after July 18, 1985
rather than precipitously terminate therapy sessions in an office
setting and continue on-going contacts with K.G. elsewhere.
Had Respondent intended to unmistakably end K.G.'s status as
a client in mid-July 1985, she had the responsibility to utilize
proper procedures to terminate that relationship.

Respondent

clearly failed to do so. Her clinical notes do not corroborate
her claims that K.G. desired to end therapy, that therapy for him
was no longer warranted or that any other proper basis existed to
end the client/therapist relationship.

Further, her testimony in

that regard is not persuasive.
Given all of the foregoing, it is not surprising K.G. wanted
to accompany Respondent to Hawaii and it is entirely regrettable
Respondent consented to that joint vacation.

Based on

Respondent's testimony as to the motivation for her acquiescence
in that regard, she had clearly assumed undue responsibility for
K.G.'s general welfare.

Thus, Respondent's inability or

unwillingness to avoid cross-tranference with K.G. also
12

conflicted with his best interests.
Sparing detail, Respondent also violated R153-35-5(B)(1)(e).
The Board initially notes that K.G.'s conduct in relationships
with other individuals reflects a degree of situational ethics
and dishonesty.

The Board further recognizes the somewhat self-

serving nature of Respondent's testimony, particularly given the
nature of this proceeding and possible consequences as to her
Licensure.

However, based on credible testimony offered by

K.G.'s brother and ex-wife which tends to corroborate K.G.'s
testimony, and a considered assessment of the respective
credibility of both K.G. and Respondent, the Board concludes that
physically intimate sexual activity occurred while they were in
Hawaii.
Thus, an appropriate basis exists to enter a disciplinary
sanction with respect to Respondent's ability to practice as a
certified and clinical social worker in this state.

Commendably,

Respondent has adjusted the nature of her practice in certain
respects as a result of her experience with K.G. as a client.
Specifically, Respondent no longer offers counseling to single
male clients other than in a family setting, she does not permit
home visits by clients and she thus recognizes certain boundary
issues and the need to avoid creating inappropriate levels of
dependency between herself and clients.

Further, there is no

evidence Respondent has engaged in unprofessional conduct with
respect to other clients.
Despite the foregoing, Respondent did engage in highly
questionable clinical practices with regard to the counseling she
13

offered to K.G.

The nature of the numerous deficiencies in

Respondent's professional performance reflects the need for
additional education of a remedial nature. Respondent's conduct
also periodically conflicted with the best interests of both K.G.
and his ex-wife in various respects.

Thusf an appropriately

severe sanction should enter to reflect the extreme degree of
Respondent's departure from generally accepted ethical standards
which govern her profession and with due regard for the adverse
consequences which resulted from that misconduct.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's licenses to
practice as a certified and clinical social worker in the State
of Utah be revoked.
It is further ordered that a stay of enforcement enter as to
the just-stated revocation, Respondent's license as a clinical
social worker shall be suspended for three (3) years and her
license as a certified social worker shall be suspended for one
(1) year, effective thirty (30) days from the date this
Recommended Order may be adopted by the Director of the Division
of Occupational and Professional Licensing.

The suspension of

Respondent's licenses is subject to the following terms and
conditions:
1. Respondent shall receive individual
therapy from either a psychologist,
psychiatrist or clinical social worker who
has been licensed in that capacity and
continuously so employed for at least the
last five (5) years. At a minimum, such
therapy shall address Respondent's ethical
violations, her responsiblity for that
conduct, the manner in which her codependency
may have contributed to her misconduct and
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proper procedures necessary to manage a
client/therapist relationship.
2. Within thirty (30) days from the date
this Recommended Order may be adopted,
Respondent shall submit the name of the
above-referenced therapist for Board review
and possible approval. Thereafter,
Respondents therapist shall submit written
reports to the Board every six (6) months as
to the nature of therapy provided to
Respondent and her progress in that regard.
Therapy shall continue until such time as
Respondent's therapist informs the Board it
is no longer warranted and the Board
recommends that therapy may cease.
3. Respondent shall meet with the Board
during the next regularly scheduled Board
meeting held after this Recommended Order may
be adopted. Thereafter, Respondent shall
meet with the Board every six (6) months
during the terms of suspension set forth
herein. The frequency of such meetings may
be subsequently modified, as deemed warranted
by the Board.
4. Respondent shall complete coursework
which addresses the subjects of professional
values and ethics, DSM - IIIf human growth
and development, and clinical practice
procedures. Within thirty (30) days from the
date this Recommended Order may be adopted,
Respondent shall submit an education program
for Board review and approval, which provides
a minimum of nine (9) quarter hours to be
completed in that respect.
5. Upon satisfactory completion of the
above-stated terms and conditions and the
expiration of the one (1) year suspension of
Respondent's license as a certified social
worker, Respondent may practice in that
capacity in an agency setting, but may not
engage in private practice. Respondent's
employment shall be subject to supervision by
a licensed clinical social worker.
Respondent shall provide prior written notice
to the Board of any such employment and her
prospective supervisor in that regard. Upon
Board review and approval, such employment
may commence and Respondent's supervisor
shall submit written reports to the Board
every six (6) months as to the nature of
15

Respondent's duties and her performance in
that regard.
Should Respondent fail to comply with the above-stated terms
and conditions or otherwise violate any statute or rule which
governs her practice as a social worker in the State of Utahf
further proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made
whether the revocation of Respondent's licenses shall become
effective.
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ADDENDUM C

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES
OF TERESA L. NELSON TO PRACTICE
AS A CERTIFIED AND CLINICAL
SOCIAL WORKER IN THE
STATE OF UTAH

ORDER ON REVIEW
CASE NO. OPL-90-26

INTRODUCTION
By order dated January 10, 1992 (the "Order") , the Director of
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the Utah
Department of Commerce

(the "Division") adopted the findings of

fact, conclusions of law, and recommended order of the Utah Board
of Social Work Examiners

(the "Board").

The Order followed a

hearing on a petition filed by the Division requesting sanctions
against the license of Teresa L. Nelson ("Respondent") to practice
as a certified social worker and as a clinical social worker.
The Order revoked Respondent's

licenses

to practice as a

certified social worker and as a clinical social worker.

The

revocations were stayed subject to certain conditions, among them:
that Respondent's license as a clinical social worker be suspended
for three years, and the license as a certified social worker be
suspended for one year; that Respondent receive therapy; that she
complete an education program; and that upon reinstatement of her
license to practice as a certified social worker she not practice
in-a private setting.

Respondent filed a request for agency review, and the Division
filed

a

response

thereto.

Respondent

was

represented

by

attorney at the hearing and also in her request for review.

an
In

connection with review, Respondent seeks the following remedies:
1.
a

that the portions of the Recommended Order providing for

three-year

suspension of Respondent's

license as a clinical

social worker, and a one-year suspension of her license as a
certified social worker, be reversed and instead, that an order
enter permitting Respondent to continue to practice;
2.

that paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order provide for

counselling of Respondent for only one year, rather than until the
Board recommend that it cease; and
3.

that

paragraph

5

of

the

Recommended

Order

(that

Respondent may not, after the one-year suspension of her certified
social worker's license, engage in private practice) be reversed.

STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
The review of this matter is being conducted by the Executive
Director of the Department of Commerce pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section 63-46b-12, and Rule 151-46b-12 of the Rules of Procedure
for Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce.

THE ISSUES REVIEWED
1.

Whether

excluding

certain

evidence

at

the

hearing

(results of a polygraph) unfairly denied Respondent the right to
present credible evidence on her own behalf;
- 2 -

2.

Whether the Board based its findings on an issue (alleged

adverse impact on a witness caused by Respondent's conduct) which
was not properly before it, where evidence on that issue had been
excluded by a prior order of the Administrative Law Judge;
3.

Whether certain facts upon which the Board relied were

not supported by the evidence; and
4.

Whether

the sanctions

imposed

are

unduly

harsh or

otherwise unfair.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The following findings of fact in the Recommended Order

are contested by Respondent:
a.

that there was a sexual relationship during 1985

between Respondent and K.G., Respondent's patient for a time
and a witness at the hearing; and
b.

that

K.G.

had

developed

a

dependency

upon

Respondent.
2.

As to the existence of a sexual relationship, if any,

between Respondent and K.G. during 1985, the Board considered
testimony that such relationship did exist, from K.G., from K.G.'s
brother, and from K.G.'s ex-wife.

It considered testimony that

there was no such relationship from Respondent. The Administrative
Law Judge declined to allow evidence from a polygraph examination
of Respondent which, Respondent argues, would have tended to
support her testimony. Respondent asserts that the "most credible
evidence" would have been the polygraph. Respondent does not point
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out why the evidence from the client and others is not credible,
nor does she offer convincing evidence or arguments that polygraph
results are more credible than testimony from witnesses.
3.

As to whether the client had developed a dependency on

Respondent, Respondent argues that findings of fact on this point
are

not

supported

by

the

evidence.

Respondent

offered no

transcript but merely asserted this point in the request for
review.

The Order made no specific findings of fact regarding

K.G.'s dependency upon Respondent.

The Conclusions of Law stated

in part that:
Moreover, given K.G.'s existing problems with alcoholism
and Respondent's diagnosis of his mental condition, it is
critically significant she failed to understand and appreciate
K.G. would thus tend to develop increasing dependency on her
as his therapist.
The nature of the bartering agreement
between Respondent and K.G. also fostered
such dependency and
reflects Respondent's further failure to manage the
therapeutic relationship in such a way that the proper
boundaries of that relationship were clearly understood by the
client. [Order, p. 10; italics added.]
Given K.G.'s dependency on Respondent
as his therapist,
he perceived the contact between them which arose from the
bartering agreement to be beneficial to him in a therapeutic
sense, even though Respondent may not have either recognized
or intended that result. However, the enhanced dependency
created by the nature of the bartering agreement was not
proper. [Order, p. 11; italics added.]

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
unfair

With respect to whether excluding polygraph evidence was
to

Respondent,

I conclude

that

the

decision

of

the

Administrative Law Judge excluding the evidence should be upheld.
Although the rules of evidence in administrative proceedings are
meant to be flexible and less formal than the Utah Rules of
- 4 -

Evidence, and therefore admitting polygraph evidence may have been
permissible, the decision to deny the evidence was reasonable under
the circumstances.

The state offered precedent that polygraph

evidence is insufficiently credible and that such evidence may be
denied admission in the administrative forum.

In addition, the

Order was based on sufficient evidence other than that germane to
the

polygraph

--

e.g.

whether

or

not

there

relationship at a specific time and place.

was

a

sexual

Although the Board

found sufficient evidence to support the finding that a sexual
relationship actually occurred, even if it had not there was still
sufficient evidence and findings to support a penalty. Aside from
the sexual relationship, the Order found that Respondent had
improperly socialized with the client; had not properly terminated
the patient-therapist

relationship; engaged in behavior which

conflicted with the patient's best

interests; had improperly

conducted joint counselling with the patient and his wife; and
otherwise failed to act in the patient's best interest.
2.
primarily

Respondent asserts that adverse impact on the patient -that

he

became

dependent

improperly considered by the Board.

upon

Respondent

--

was

As to whether the client had

become dependent upon Respondent, reading the quoted language from
pages 10 and 11 of the Order, (see Findings of Fact, above, at
paragraph 3) , it appears that the Order went from what could happen
to assuming that it did happen. As there are no specific findings
of fact regarding dependency, that portion of the Order concluding
that K.G. was in fact dependent upon Respondent is overturned.
- 5 -

Even if the issue of adverse impact on the client was improperly
before the Board it appears that

the Order is supported by

sufficient findings aside from this point.

Although the issue of

impact was addressed in the Order, it was only briefly raised.
Rather, the Board found that Respondent exercised poor judgement
with respect to the trip to Hawaii; she engaged in a social
relationship and other conduct which conflicted with the best
interests of her client; she did not adequately terminate the
professional

relationship

prior

to

beginning

a

personal

relationship; her conduct constituted unprofessional conduct within
the meaning of Rule 153-35-5(B).

From the terms of the order, it

appears that these items were given much more weight than any
adverse impact on K.G. and that these items were sufficient to
support a sanction against Respondent's license. The Order clearly
indicates that the reasons for the sanction are the actions of
Respondent, rather than their effect on someone else.

As noted

above, the impact, if any, on the client, even if not admissible is
a relatively minor portion of the decision.
3.

The sanctions entered are within the Board's authority.

Both Section 58-1-15 and Section 58-35-11 allow the Board to deny,
suspend, revoke or place on probation a license where the licensee
has been guilty of unprofessional conduct.

Based on Respondent's

own admissions, she clearly exercised poor judgement and allowed
the relationship to expand beyond what is appropriate professional
conduct.

While there is sufficient evidence that a sanction is

warranted, the penalty imposed by the Board seems unduly harsh in
- 6-

view

cf

penalties

suspension
h"1

rn tv rv

htj

Respondent

filtered

J

t i m o rt i Lti

than t h i s

one,

a p p e a r t o be a s i q m f i c a n t
4.

In

provides that
lit

or

s o c i a l worker
not

I dragraph

Respondent * a

|ortiuu

l

n|

aapppd RHspunnt in

certain

length

t pe

jjqia

order
IIIII

ot

license

practice,

a« >'

to

there

IMMH

h mil , OeM .

the

does 11 o to

order

needs

i \ open-ended
MI

I MJ

piuljdi

practice

II
11 mini i

JI

as

i

certified

in tnpinoy , <MLniq LUL way
to leave

'his

t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e Order appeal a

, j p.:enia< a anal pi a i

Mi

that

The o r d e r a p p e a r s

However

timo,

igamct

and t h e e x p i r a t i o n o t t h e c ne y e a r

aubject

to certain

a l t h o u g h such a c t i o n s a r e p r o p e r ,
I raio i <,

<>f

ypar

MM* a ;;pat MI

complaints

nnhMa

MM

A three

ai a^n

ot tier

M:*sp -aidant mav pi ini- a t in

engage in p i i w t e

f

in-

upon natiaOin t i a ) anmpJiM

p r o h i b i t i o n permanent
MI

i mi

I i.xaiio and a, hdj L i o n s l i s t e d ,

.suspension

cases.

and t h e t a c t

i 1 t

addition,

'1 ar i t i c a t i o n

jimilar

u n a o a n o n a r l t , [ a r t i ui u n

| ioSaa-other

in

IIMI

UII

t e r m s and

the prohibition

| < »r in niorit

"i

ptobatiou

loi

a

conditions,

aqainat

open-ended.

,n

o"

-

Thet eioiue,

p c i r a g r a p h 5 o t t h e o r d e r i s m o d i f i e d s o a s t o make t h e p r o h i b i t i o n
against private practice less indefinite

or opt. n •••ended.

ORDER
__L iw nerebv ' ~~'"if"irrM *~'u^*
1.

a

following per: : aa

aw are modi tied by striking

the

rcunc " ^uge 11 of the Findings, Conclusions

and Order:
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I
Respondent, sha.
ctava . adiviiua,
neiaa /
troin eitnei a psycnoiogisa. psychiatrist . r
. :a: . .
social wc;.rker who has been Incensed :.;: that capaciy an.3
continuous Ja: :o emploved for ..t least the last :':ve - ;
years.
At 1 minimum, such therapy sha_i address
Respondent' a ethical violations her responsibility ~~~
that conauct
1 he manner in waa ;n her codependencv
have contributed to her misconduct and proper prcrectu: * ;
necessar- to manao^ : r]ipnt/th^rapi^r re]r--::" :- .
witnia t;iii.„? i,\w ;ays from the ajce • 1 ill?
Order, Respondent shall aubmit the name of the abovereference- i therapist tar Board review and approval. If
the Boar a 'ioes not approve, then Respondent shall
promptly submit another name until the Board approves,
Thereafter, Respondent shall commence therapy and
Respondent^:, therapist shall submit written reports to
the Boaa-- *• "-*-"
fM month, • .a:i f t 1 he nature of
8

therapy provided to Respondent and her progress i n tl lat
regard. Respondent shall execute a written consent and
release if necessary, so as to allow her therapist to
disclose such matters to the Board.
Therapy shall
continue until such time as Respondent's therapist
informs the Board that therapy is no longer warranted and
the Board recommends that therapy may cease, or until the
expiration of the three years' probationary period,
whi chever occurs fi rst ,
3 . Respondent shall meet with the Board during the
next regularly scheduled Board meeting held after this
Order becomes effective. Thereafter, Respondent shall
meet with the Board every' six (6) months during the term
of suspension and probation.
The frequency of such
mee t ings may be subs equent J y modi f i ed, a s deemed
warranted by the Board
4
Respondent sha11 comp1e te conrsework whi ch
addresses the subjects of professional values and ethics,
DSM-III, human growth and development, and clinical
practice procedures. Within thirty (30) days from the
date this Order becomes effective, Respondent shall
submit an education program for Board review and
approval, which provides a minimum of nine (9) quarter
hours to be completed in that respect:
5.
Uui jjiy the three -year probationary period, and
unless the Board finds that Respondent is not meeting the
terms and conditions of probation (which finding the
Board may make in an informal proceeding) , Respondent may
practice , as a certified social worker in an agency
setting, but may not engage 2 n private practice.
Respondent's employment shall be subject to supervision
by a\licensed, clinical social worker. Respondent shall
provide prior written notice to the Board of any si ich
employment and her prospective supervisor in that regard.
Upon Board review and approval., such employment may
commence and Respondent's supervisor shall submit \ /ri ttieii
reports to the Board every six (6) months as"" to the
nature of Respondent's duties and her performance in that
regard.
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order on review is issued.
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'
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David L. Buhler, Executive Director
Department *" '^nmerce
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Judicial review of this Order may be
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and Section 63-46b 16.

CERTIFICATE /* F ^ \ I L". "v.
^ L . *. JL -*. ,
9 92, I
lay
ue
a s n o t e d o t h e r w i s e ) a t r u e and c r r e c :•: '~'r d e r . ; i c o e r j \
ostace prepaid,
ia: osseci

caused tc be raiiea ( e x c e p t

,'uzanne M
'ir.pt

r^llirr—

Arizct:^

o4^S5 oo44

..C. Fox 680434
J
3IK
itv, Ut ar ° r o 8
«jvi : L r :>£ . •.;; _: Jirecccr
Division or r.-cupat LJ: , .n t : Dfessional Licensing
P.O. Fox 4580
Jdi: Lake Cit\ , CtaL i ».4rj-v'8' :
vHai.3 Fei :ve: e 11
Robert Steed
Assistant Attorney General
Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State StreetSalt Lake City, Utah 84111
(Ha nil Pe 11 vered)

CfccPlaXl

- 11 -

